SAFETY & ALIGNMENT

EXHIBIT 15 OF 24 · MODULE 4: GUARDRAIL SYSTEMS

DEFENSE

Multi-Agent Privilege Separation

Compartmentalizing un-trusted user-facing agents from privileged tool-executors through dual-boundary gateway verifiers.

INTERACTIVE EXHIBIT 15

Multi-Agent Privilege Separation Architecture

UNTRUSTED AGENTUser Chat InterfaceTainted data exposurePermissions: 0 toolsVALIDATOR GATEWAYPydantic schema checkQuarantine taint testEnforces least privilegeEXECUTOR AGENTSQL / Bash / APIsSanitized calls onlyHuman approval gateISOLATION ACTIVE: Even if User Agent is hijacked, it cannot directly invoke system tools.Principle of Least Privilege: separate untrusted conversational reasoning from privileged execution.
PRIVILEGE COMPARTMENT
LEAST PRIVILEGE

Quarantine taint tracking ensures untrusted data cannot flow directly into SQL/Bash invocations.

💡 Production Practice: Place strict token quotas on tool call iterations to prevent recursive prompt injection loops.
← 14 Semantic Firewalls & Canary TokensSafety Atlas (32 Concepts)16 Constrained Decoding & Logit Filtering →
Agent-native web · research mode

Experimental WebMCP · evolving community-group draft, not a W3C Standard or on the Standards Track.

Native status: Initializing. Registered: none

DOM → inferred capabilities · WebMCP → declared capabilities. Tools read real CUDA/Inference Atlas content. Calls may highlight temporary UI state. No backend or remote telemetry.

Local harness verifies application logic; it does not demonstrate native discovery or a browser agent.

Input schema
{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "query": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 1,
      "maxLength": 300
    },
    "limit": {
      "type": "integer",
      "minimum": 1,
      "maximum": 10
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "query"
  ],
  "additionalProperties": false
}
Local log: last 100 calls while this panel is open. Inputs may contain personal text; review before sharing.
 
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