EXHIBIT 22 OF 24 · MODULE 6: DECEPTION & GOVERNANCE
DEFENSE
Agent Sandboxing & Syscall Interception
Executing agent code in isolated gVisor/Firecracker microVMs with eBPF syscall filtering and dry-run impact simulation.
INTERACTIVE EXHIBIT 22
Agent MicroVM Sandboxing & eBPF Syscall Traps
SANDBOX ISOLATION TIER
MICROVM (KVM)
eBPF probes block unauthorized network egress and host metadata queries.
💡 Ephemeral Teardown: MicroVM filesystems are discarded immediately after code execution.
ARCHITECTURAL OVERVIEW
Agent Sandboxing & Syscall Interception
Autonomous coding agents and tool-executors possess the ability to run shell scripts, install packages, and manipulate operating systems. Sandboxing enforces microVM virtualization, kernel-level syscall interception (via eBPF/seccomp), and strict network isolation to prevent agent jailbreaks from compromising host infrastructure.
MicroVM Isolation (Firecracker / gVisor)
Standard Docker containers share the host Linux kernel. Agent code execution must run inside dedicated microVMs (e.g. AWS Firecracker) with dedicated guest kernels and 5ms startup times.
eBPF & Seccomp Syscall Filtering
Intercept dangerous syscalls (e.g. `execve`, `socket`, `ptrace`, `chroot`). Any attempt to read `/proc/kcore`, probe AWS metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), or bind listening ports is blocked at the kernel boundary.
Dry-Run Simulation & Blast Radius Limits
Executing destructive commands (e.g., `rm -rf`, `DROP TABLE`, `kubectl delete`) triggers an automated dry-run simulation that estimates affected resources before requesting human authorization.
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION · MICROVM EXECUTION LATENCY VS SECURITY OVERHEAD
Firecracker microVMs achieve boot times under 10ms with minimal memory footprint (5MB per VM), allowing ephemeral per-task VM creation that provides hypervisor-grade security with near-zero latency penalty.
REAL-WORLD PRODUCTION ENGINEERING
Block access to the link-local cloud metadata IP (169.254.169.254) in iptables to prevent IAM role exfiltration.
Mount the root guest filesystem as read-only, allocating a strictly size-capped in-memory tmpfs for ephemeral working directories.
Enforce hard execution timeouts (e.g. max 30 seconds) and memory limits (max 512MB RAM) on all agent subprocesses.