SAFETY & ALIGNMENT

EXHIBIT 22 OF 24 · MODULE 6: DECEPTION & GOVERNANCE

DEFENSE

Agent Sandboxing & Syscall Interception

Executing agent code in isolated gVisor/Firecracker microVMs with eBPF syscall filtering and dry-run impact simulation.

INTERACTIVE EXHIBIT 22

Agent MicroVM Sandboxing & eBPF Syscall Traps

FIRECRACKER MICROVM (GUEST KERNEL)Ephemeral Guest FS (tmpfs)Boot time: 5ms | Mem: 5MBAgent Subprocess: rm -rf / ; curl evil.comeBPF SYSCALL MONITORIntercepts: execve, socket, ptraceBlocked: Metadata IP (169.254.169.254)TRAP: Syscall dropped at kernel boundaryBLAST RADIUS CONTAINED: Ephemeral VM destroyed after execution with zero host impact.Hypervisor-level isolation (KVM) ensures untrusted code cannot touch host memory.
SANDBOX ISOLATION TIER
MICROVM (KVM)

eBPF probes block unauthorized network egress and host metadata queries.

💡 Ephemeral Teardown: MicroVM filesystems are discarded immediately after code execution.
Agent-native web · research mode

Experimental WebMCP · evolving community-group draft, not a W3C Standard or on the Standards Track.

Native status: Initializing. Registered: none

DOM → inferred capabilities · WebMCP → declared capabilities. Tools read real CUDA/Inference Atlas content. Calls may highlight temporary UI state. No backend or remote telemetry.

Local harness verifies application logic; it does not demonstrate native discovery or a browser agent.

Input schema
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Local log: last 100 calls while this panel is open. Inputs may contain personal text; review before sharing.

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